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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL REASONING:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN FEDERAL TAX CASES
DANIEL M. SCHNEIDER*
INTRODUCTION
Common wisdom and legal literature reveal how we think judges think. If you
asked lawyers how judges decide cases, they would most likely respond with
something about precedents, rules, reasoning, and arguments-notwithstanding what
supporters of legal realism, critical legal studies, race theories, and feminism might
say. But if you asked social scientists the same question, they would more likely
inquire about the judge's socioeconomic background, education, or sex, assembling
the data and sifting it for clues that predict behavior.
Literature is full of arguments about how we think judges interpret statutes.
Approaches range from strict construction to nonliteralism, sauntering through
pragmatism. All of these approaches resonate in tax. The methods are founded in
theory grounded by analysis of discrete collections of cases. The importance of
theory to statutory interpretation cannot be denied, but theory alone cannot explain
how judges have actually interpreted the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).
There has been little empirical research in tax law about judges,' and none that
explains how they interpret the Code.2 In this article, I review a large number of
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article. I would also like to thank Charles Cappel and David Kamens for talking to me about statistics, and Susan
Boland, at the College's Library, for her assistance.
rSNT
WrIHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM
1. See, e.g. , BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DI
0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975) (reviewing Justice Douglas's federal tax decisions); James Edward
Maule, InstantReplay. Weak Teams, and DisputedCalls: An EmpiricalStudy of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66
TENN. L REv. 351 (1999) (presenting original empirical research on alleged bias in the Tax Court); Beverly 1.
Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the FourBlind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax
Decisions,39 How. LJ. 841 (1996) (reviewing the Burger Court's federal tax decisions).
2. While no one has yet empirically investigated how judges decide federal tax cases, there are some pieces
of tax law literature that use empirical data. See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur, Do They Practice What We Teach?: A
Survey of Practitionersand Estate Planning Professors, 19 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1999) (surveying estate planning);
Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS LJ. 63 (1993) (surveying couples' views regarding income sharing); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases
Go to Trial?:An EmpiricalStudy of Predictorsof Failureto Settle, 49 CASE W. L REV. 315 (1999) (presenting
original empirical research regarding settlement of Tax Court cases); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice Abreu,
Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998) (studying
progressive taxation based on empirical research done by Congressional Budget Office); Beverly I. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wls. L REV. 751 (questioning racial bias
of Code based on empirical research done by Bureau of Census and other government agencies); Philip F.
Postlewaite, Lfe After Tenure: Where Have All the Articles Gone?, 48 J. LEGAL EDuc. 558 (1998) (presenting
original empirical research regarding publication by tenured tax law professors); Daniel M. Schneider, Interpreting
the Interpreters:Assessing Forty-Five Years of Tax Literature, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 483 (1999) (giving original
empirical research regarding tax literature); William J. Turnier et al., RedistributiveJustice and CulturalFeminism,
45 AM. U. L REV. 1275 (1996) (analyzing redistributive justice in tax by gender); see also works cited supra note
I.
The need for more empirical research in tax law has been noted. See, e.g., Michael Livingston,
Reinventing Tax Scholarship:Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L REV. 365
(1998).
For examples of some more traditional articles aboutjudges' decisions, see Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood
Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. LJ. 2011 (1992) (reviewing tax decisions of Justice Marshall) and Marvin A.
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federal tax cases using social science methods to answer two questions not asked by
more traditional legal scholars:
* Have courts favored one method of interpreting the Code over others?
" What personal characteristics prompt a judge to use a particular method?
Tools of the social sciences lend themselves to analyzing large numbers of
decisions.' While social science research sometimes concedes the importance a
judge may assign to the legal precedent upon which lawyers rely in making a
decision, it also grapples with how a judge's socioeconomic characteristics--e.g.,
gender, education, politics--can influence her decisions.4 This article draws that
research into federal tax law. Using a database comprised of a large number of Tax
Court and federal district court cases decided in three cities over a twenty-year
period, the article describes the methods of statutory interpretation judges employed
to justify their decisions and the effect judges' social backgrounds had on the
methods they used.
This empirical research differs from theoretical observations about interpreting
the Code. Instead of suggesting that particular methods were applied in isolation-a
common posture of scholars-the article establishes that judges were broad minded,
applying all methods and frequently combining them in a way that defies scholarly
purity. It also establishes that some social background characteristics may help to
explain why judges use certain methods.
This article is divided into four parts. First, it examines law review articles
discussing interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code and social science research.
Next, the article sets forth the methodology used in the research, discussing the
selection of cases and variables. Third, it describes and analyzes the empirical data.
Finally, it sets forth conclusions that may be drawn from the data.
I. LITERATURE
A. Interpretingthe InternalRevenue Code
The broader debate about statutory construction, as well as the debate within the
field of tax law, can be reduced to those who favor a more literal method of
interpretation and those who do not.5 Five methods of interpretation that are

Chireistein, Learned Hand'sContributionto the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE LJ. 440 (1968) (reviewing Judge
Hand's tax decisions).
3. See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a CelebratedConcern, 60 OHiO ST. LJ. 1675 (1999) (analyzing labor law decisions using
social sciences tools); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the JudicialMind: An EmpiricalStudy of
JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L REv. 1377 (1998) (analyzing decisions about federal sentencing standards using
social sciences tools).
4. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORrrY RULE OR MINORrrY WILL: ADHERENCE
TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE SUPREME

COURT AND THE ATITruDINAL MODEL (1992); Howard Gillnan, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial
BehavioristsTest the "Legal Model" ofJudicialDecisionMaking, 26 LAw & SOc. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (examining
the behaviorist approach). Brudney et al., supranote 3, and Sisk et al., supranote 3, were among the first legal
scholars to conduct empirical research on judicial reasoning using logistic regression. But cf Orley Ashenfelter et
al., Politics and the Judiciary:The Influence of JudicialBackground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1995) (analyzing everyday, published, district court decisions, but using means, not logistic regression).
5. No particular theory for interpreting the Code is promoted here. Grounding the interpretation in what
judges have done is important, so I have tried to refer readers as much as possible to other scholars' legal research
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predominantly reflected in scholarly literature also appear in the sampled cases. An
overview of these methods follows.
1. Strict Construction
One approach to interpreting the Internal Revenue Code is to take the words of
the Code literally. While his article, Text as Limit: A Pleafor a Decent Respect for
the Tax Code,6 does not argue for a strictly literal approach to interpretation,
Professor John Coverdale does suggest that the Code should not be read in an
"antitextual" manner. He would not have "provisions of the Code [read] in other
ways that fall outside the range of meanings that their text, taken in context, has in
ordinary speech or in other provisions of the Code."' In other words, he perceives
antitextual interpretations as those "that provoke us to think, 'If that is what
Congress meant, it should have said so rather than saying something very
different."' 8 While the article does not take up whether "the statutory language so
clearly compels a particular result that it is appropriate to ignore other sources of
meaning," 9 it does give such great weight to the text that there is little room for
nonliteral interpretations.'0
According to Coverdale, reliance upon the text of a statute requires respect for the
integrity of our constitutional values, which give Congress, not the courts, the
primary policy-making role." Coverdale also suggests that tax is different than other
substantive areas of law, and the highly formalistic rules Congress has laid down in
tax, as opposed to vaguer standards used elsewhere, dictate greater deference to the
Code's language.' As he writes,
[t]he prohibition against antitextual interpretations of the Code...[for which I
argue] could be defended on grounds that legislative intent and purpose are
either meaningless concepts or illegitimate considerations not to be considered

about interpreting tax statutes for different theories of construction. I believe that the difficulty of understanding
empirical research often impedes the use of such research by tax lawyers, so I have also attempted to lead readers
to other scholars' legal research about the impact of judges' social backgrounds on the outcomes of their decisions
in order to minimize technical discussion in this article.
For example, this article uses logistic regression in order to explore the relationship between methods
of statutory construction and social background factors because that is the most appropriate method for analyzing
the relationship between dichotomous dependent variables (e.g., method of construction) and several categorical
or ordinal variables (e.g., gender, politics, education). Readers interested in learning more about logistic regression,
as well as less law-oriented research, are referred to discussion in this article, infra Part M.C. See also Brudney et
al., supra note 3, at 1681-92; Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1385-95; Lederman, supra note 2.
6. John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Pleafor a Decent Respectfor the Tax Code. 71 TUL. L REV. 1501
(1997); see also Joseph lsenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHi. L REv. 859 (1982)
(arguing against risks of nonliteral interpretation); cf Mary L Heen Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence, 48 HAsTINGS LJ. 771 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's increasing reliance on the "plain
meaning" of a statute when deciding tax cases).
7. Coverdale, supra note 6, at 1503 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 1504.
9. Id at 1505.
10. Id
11. Id. at 1515-16.
12. Id at 1521-25. But see Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation
of Tax Statutes, 51 TAxL REv. 677, 683-87 (1996) (noting that tax is not different than other areas of law); cf.John
A. Miller, Indeterminancy, Complexity, and Fairness: Just;fying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68
WASH. L REv. 1 (1993) (arguing that tax statutes should rely more on standards than on rules).
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by a court in interpreting statutes. It does not, however, require either of these

positions. The argument for avoiding antitextual results rests comfortably on the
much narrower proposition that, in the search for congressional intent and
statutory3 purpose, the enacted language of the statute should be the primary
guide.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from literal interpretations are nonliteral
ones, casually used by tax lawyers-when they rely on a section's legislative history
or on a regulation, for example-without thought, perhaps, other than how to best
serve the client. After all, if the meaning of a statute were clear, why interpret it?
(And, if the statute did not require interpretation, why hire a lawyer?) Many
commentators argue for nonliteral interpretations of the Code, for various reasons,
using one of the four approaches noted below.
2. Regulations
One method for interpreting a statute is to defer to regulations promulgated by the

Treasury Department.' 4 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,

Inc., 5 provides a recent anchor in that sea. Chevron marks the Supreme Court's
deference to agency regulations in light of ambiguous statutes, holding that the
regulation controls if Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue... [and if] the agency's answer... [is] based on a permissible construction of the
statute."' 6 Although decided in the environmental law area, Chevron's application
to other highly regulated areas, like tax, seems obvious. 7 Implicit in Chevron is a
theoretical deference to Congress and then to the agency.' 8
3. Structure

Deference also may be given to the purpose of a statute as part of the structure of
the larger Code in which it is situated. In InterpretingTax Legislation: The Role of

Purpose,9 Professor Deborah Geier suggests that there is a "theoretical construct
that overarches the sum total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to
be captured by it... and that statutory structure could come within the umbrella of

13. Coverdale, supra note 6, at 1518-19.
14. See generally Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations,
44 TAx LAw. 343 (1991) (reviewing tax regulations); Moran & Schneider, supra note 1, at 907-27 (discussing the
Burger Court's record on reliance on regulations in its tax decisions); Bernard Wolfman. Note: Supreme Court
Decisions in Taxation: 1980 Term, 35 TAX LAw. 443 (1982) (reviewing use of regulations by Supreme Court).
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. Id. at 842-43.
17. Chevron has never garnered much attention in tax cases. See Heen, supra note 6, at 784-86. Heen cites,
among others, Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 51 (1996)
(discussing Chevron); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulirigs, 72 B.U. L
REV. 841 (1992) (same); Samuel B. Sterrett, Suggested Approach for Judicial Interpretation of Regulations that

Grant Discretion to Taxpayers, 12 VA. TAX REv. 477 (1993) (discussing post-Chevron Supreme Court decisions).
Id
18. See Heen, supra note 6, at 781.
19. Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995).
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statutory purpose."" For Geier, tax statutes should be interpreted consistently with
that structure.2 The Supreme Court has done precisely that in cases like Crane v.
Commissioner22 and Tufts v. Commissioner,'3 which analyze the income tax
4
consequences of nonrecourse debt, Corn ProductsRefining Co. v. Commissioner?
and Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,'2 which assess the meaning of a capital
asset, and Bob Jones University v. United States,26 which addresses the propriety of
allowing charitable deductions for contributions to racially discriminatory colleges. 27
In each area, the Court fit these cases into a broader statutory purpose. To Geier,
"purposivism" is "a joint effort between Congress and' the courts... [in which]
Congress's law... includes that larger statutory structure."2
4. Legislative History
In Congress,the Courts,and the Code: LegislativeHistoryand the Interpretation
of Tax Statutes,29 Professor Michael Livingston argues for the use of legislative
history. To Livingston, "[tihe argument in favor of using legislative history, simply
put, is that context is important to the ascertainment of meaning, and legislative
history is an important part of context."' He details the important role congressional
committee staffs play in writing tax legislation, running from the initial conceptual
presentation of proposals to committee members through drafting committee
reports.3" Livingston also notes that while many cases use legislative history in
conjunction with some other approach 3to2 statutory construction, others use it as an
independent ground for their decisions.
The best way to view tax legislative history may be in institutional terms, as part
of the evolving relationship between Congress, the courts, and administrative
agencies in the making of tax law and policy. This approach treats legislative
history not as an alternative to "literal" interpretation, but as one of several
sources of contextual authority for courts deciding tax cases. It seeks to evaluate
legislative history not (or not only) by assessing whether it reflects congressional
intent, but by analyzing the function performed by the legislative history and the
persuasiveness of legislative history in performing that function. 3

20. Id. at 497, 502; see also Moran & Schneider, supra note 1. at 928-942 (speaking about the "deep
structure" of the Code).
21. Id at493.
22. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
24. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
25. 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
26. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
27. These cases are drawn from Livingston, supra note 12, at 689-701.
28. Geier, supra note 19, at 508 (citation omitted). Geier gives simple examples of respect for the purpose
of a statute, including deducing Congress's desire to avoid assignment of income from its imposition of progressive
tax rates and its disallowance of an interest deduction to a taxpayer who has borrowed without a profit motive
because the purpose of business and investment deductions requires such a motive. Id. at 500-01.
29. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretationof
Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L REv. 819 (1991).
30. Id at 845 (footnote omitted).
3 1. Id. at 832-44.
32. Id. at849-71.
33. Id. at 873.
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Thus, Livingston is less worried about the influence of committee staff members in
writing tax laws than he is about Congress exceeding its institutional competence
where committee staffs draft extensive legislative histories.34 The process
notwithstanding, Livingston does not question the propriety of using legislative
history.
5. Practical Reasoning
In PracticalReason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes,
Professor Livingston argues for "practical reasoning" when interpreting the Code.35
He believes that difficulties abound with nonliteral interpretations that depend on
statutory purpose, including the inability to construct a solitary purpose out of the
minds of multiple legislators and the possibility that a statute might contain multiple,
and conflicting, purposes.36 To him, "purposivism" is a "questionable basis" for
deciding the types of cases that reflect Geier's sense of the Code's structure.37
Instead, Livingston's
approach would consider statutory text, legislative history, and evolutive
considerations-including judicial and administrative precedents and applicable
current values--together with the consequences of alternate interpretations and
the court's own policy sense. While these sources typically would be considered
in descending order of priority, the precise mix of sources would depend on the
nature of the provision in question and the facts of the case at hand. A practical
reason approach provides both the right method of deciding tax cases and an
accurate description of what courts actually do in such cases.3
B. Judges' Social Backgrounds
The legal profession's belief in the importance of doctrinal legal reasoning in
judges' decision-making processes conflicts with social science's view that ajudge's
social background can influence her behavior. Establishing links between social
background factors and judicial outcomes can diminish the relevance of more
traditional doctrinal legal theories. After all, if a judge's elite law school education
Revenue Service (the Service), what
leads her to decide in favor of the Internal
39
difference do the facts of a case make?
Tworecent law review articles survey the literature discussed above and illustrate
the current state of research on the influence of judges' social backgrounds in areas
outside of tax. 40 Both also review methodology, with an eye toward an audience of
lawyers.
The more recent of the articles-Professors James J. Brudney and Deborah J.
Merritt, and Ms. Sara Schiavoni's Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions?
34. Id at 874-78.
35. See Uvingston, supra note 12.
36. See id. at 681 (relying on William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L Rsv. 321 (1990)).

37.
38.
39.
40.

See id at 690-708.
d at720.
See Bundney et al., supra note 3. at 1681.
See id at 1682-92; Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1385-96.
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Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern4 -measures
federal appellate decisions about adjudications of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) against judges' social background criteria. The article explores
whether judges on the federal courts of appeals supported unions or management in
their NLRB decisions and what factors might have influenced those decisions. As
the article notes almost immediately,
[e]mpirical research into judicial behavior acknowledges the relevance of casespecific facts and legal precedent, but posits that judges' personal traits, their
education, training, and their pre-judicial activities can help explain court
decisions. In particular, a number of social scientists contend that pre-court life
experiences play a prominent role in shaping the personal values and policy
such biographical factors can be useful in
preferences of judges, and that
predicting judicial decisions.' 2
An obvious criticism of attempting to link judges' social backgrounds and their
decisions is that it undervalues "legal doctrine, in particular [by] failing to appreciate
how judges develop that doctrine primarily through reasoned elaboration of
language and precedent in written decisions, not through subconscious infiltration
of fife experiences."' 3 The authors' response is to demonstrate how, empirically, the
connections can be made between background and outcome. Stating the authors'
conclusions does not give full breath to their article, but it nevertheless helps to
understand the associations they drew between the social backgrounds of the judges
who decided appellate NLRB cases and how the judges acted.
[O]ur analysis has identified numerous personal, political and professional
background factors that are significantly associated with ajudge's propensity to
support or reject the union's legal position. Republican women, Democratic
men, and Democratic women are about ten percent more likely than Republican
men to vote for the union....Among all appeals from Board decisions favoring
the employer, judges with... [management-side labor] experience are more than
twice as likely as other judges to adopt the union's position and reverse the
Board. In the category of divisive issues, some of the marginal effects are even
larger, with Republican women four times more likely than otherjudges to adopt
the union's position and judges with elected office experience almost twice as
likely to do so. These findings strongly suggest that social background factors
play a meaningful role in influencing judicial approaches to labor law issues."
The second article, Professors Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P.
Morriss's Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
JudicialReasoning,45 examines district court sentencing decisions. That article took
the opportunity presented by enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, which took
effect in 1988, to determine how different courts reacted to the measures imposed

41. Brudney et al., supra note 3.

42. Id.
at 1682 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at1682 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 1761.
45. Sisk et al., supra note 3.
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on them.' The Sentencing Reform Act "established mandatory sentencing
guidelines based on the offense and the characteristics of the crime and the
' The authors' concern that research frequently fails to deal with
offender."47
"incomparability"-the extent to which empirical research into judicial decisions
might be criticized due to "differences in parties, time period, issues, and facts"-is
4
answered by review of a single issue: the constitutionality of the Act' s guidelines.
The article observes,
Our findings provide greater support to the behavioral model of judicial
decisionmaking than we anticipated. While most of the social background
variables we explored proved insignificant, some striking findings emerged that
were consistent with a sociological or social construction model of
decisionmaking, particularly with respect to the prior employment variable. For
example, prior experience as a criminal defense lawyer was significant under
several formulations of our dependent variables as an explanatory variable for
opposition to the [guidelines]. On the other hand, prior experience as a state or
4
local judge was related to upholding the [g]uidelines as constitutionally valid. '
Both of these articles use logistic regression when determining whether
background factors could be associated with judges' decisions. 50
I.METHODOLOGY
A. Data and Variables
1. Case Selection
I compiled a database consisting of all official Tax Court decisions rendered
between 1979 and 1998 and all published federal tax decisions of federal district
courts located in three major cities-Los Angeles, Chicago, and a portion of New
York City-for the same time period.5 I then sampled about fifteen percent of these
cases. I thought that these four courts would give me a broad base of decisions, and
by examining district court decisions as well as those of the Tax Court, I could

46. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2034 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
47. Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1381 (footnote omitted).
48. id at 1380-82. Sisk and his coauthors further discuss the benefit of looking at one case from the point
of view of exploring judicial reasoning. Id at 1410-11.
49. Id. at 1383.
50. Logistic regression is the appropriate multivariate technique for our analyses because our
dependent variable (a vote for or against the union) is dichotomous... .[Thelogistic regression
method models the probability of an event-how likely the event is to occur. Thus, in our
analysis we investigate judicial attributes that may impact the probability that a judge will vote
for or against the union position.
Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1708-09 n. 119; accordSisk et al., supra note 3, at 1431 n.230. But see Ashenfelter
et al., supra note 4, at 281 (deciding not to use logistic regression and determining that social background factors
did not influence judges' decisions).
51. The district court decisions were actually those rendered by judges in the Central District of California,
the Northern District of Illinois, and the Southern District of New York. Other district courts also are located in
these three metropolitan areas. For an examination of district court decisions, see Sisk et al., supranote 3, at 141516, and Ashenfelter etal., supranote 4. at 263-65.
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ascertain differences, if any, that existed between judges in the two different
tribunals. This database was comprised of 488 cases.'
A Tax Court judge sometimes adopted the decision of a special trial judge
or a district court judge adopted the decision of a magistrate. I excluded the six
decisions rendered by a special trial judge or magistrate that had not been adopted
by another, more senior judge. On the other hand, I treated the adopting judge as
having rendered the decision whenever adoption occurred." After excluding the
decisions that were not adopted, a total of 482 cases remained in the database-346
Tax Court decisions and 136 district court decisions.'
In addition to the exclusions noted above, I sometimes pared the fifty-one
summary decisions from these 482 cases in order to examine only substantive cases.
This facilitated analysis of the approach used in each case. There were 431
substantive cases.
Some authors draw distinctions between all decisions rendered by a court
and the smaller portion of these decisions that are published. To some extent, the
bias implicit in examining only cases that are selected for publication is avoided by
this article's review of official Tax Court decisions, all of which are published. In
contrast, the district court decisions in this database, all of which have been
published, are part of the larger pool of all district court decisions-including
unpublished ones. Finite resources dictated this more limited review. Nonetheless,
I was interested in describing decision making in more important federal tax cases,
and for that purpose this database was the most appropriate."
2. Variables
I culled data about judges and their social backgrounds that reflected
contemporary social issues, such as whether judges view legal questions differently
52. For each court, Irandomly picked one of the first seven cases published by it in a particular year and then
read every seventh case thereafter. For example, I might have picked the third case in the Tax Court Reports for
1986 and read every seventh case thereafter, or the fifth tax decision by the Central District of California for 1993
and every seventh case thereafter. Reading every seventh case enabled me to sample just less than fifteen percent
of the database (17=14.28%).
Establishing the base for district court decisions was somewhat more difficult, but a LEXIS search
ultimately proved most successful. That search, done during the latter half of 1999, used the following terms: "court
(central district or central dist! or c.d. prei5 california or cal.) and date is 1997." The court was varied to include the
two other district courts and the other nineteen years. I did not include a case resulting from the search--even if it
was the next, seventh case-if it was the decision of a bankruptcy judge, but I did include decisions about taxes that
involved bankruptcy. Whenever I skipped the seventh case, I sampled the next available case.
53. But cf.Brudney et aL., supra note 3, at 1696 n.8 (excluding cases that were summary affirmances).
54. The 346 Tax Court cases were decided by forty-two judges; the fewest number of opinions written by
any Tax Courtjudge was one, and the greatest number was twenty-six. The 136 district court cases were decided
by seventy-six judges; the fewest number of opinions written by any district court judge was one and the greatest
number was six.
55. Compare Brudney et al., supra note 3 (examining all opinions), and Sisk et al., supra note 3 (same), with
Ashenfelter et al., supra note 4 (examining only published opinions). See generally Elizabeth M. Horton, Selective
Publication and the Authority ofPrecedent in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 42 UCLA L REV. 1691 (1995)
(summarizing arguments regarding selective publication of cases by federal appellate courts). It might be noted that
the only Tax Court cases excluded from this database are the memorandum decisions, which carry less weight than
official decisions. See I GERALD A. KAFKA & RrrA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX
CONTROVERSIEs 12.06 (2nd ed. 1997) (describing the hierarchy of Tax Court decisions and the differences between
official and other Tax Court decisions).
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if they are women, African-American, or the beneficiaries of elite educations. I also
collected data about the cases, especially about the methods of statutory construction
used by judges that could be influenced by social background.5 6 These variables
include the following:
I. Data about the judge5 7
A. The judge's name.
B. The judge's sex.58
59
C. The judges' race or ethnicity (district courts only).
D. The judge's educationalbackground.
1. How elite was the college the judge attended'"
61
2. Did the judge go to one of eighteen elite law schools?

56. For example, I thought that the eliteness of a law school education might make a judge less likely to use
practical reasoning, so I collected data about law schools and about methods of interpretation judges used to explain
their decisions.
57. 1 used biographies of Tax Court judges set forth in the CongressionalDirectory and biographies of
district court judges made available by the Federal Judicial Center. Since February 2000, these biographies have
been published at the Center's website at httpJlair.fjc.gov/history.
58. Gender of a judge is set forth in the Federal Judicial Center's information, but not in the Congressional

Directory. Nevertheless, determining the gender of the Tax Court judges was not problematic.
Coding of the data is important for logistic regressions. Therefore, the coding of variables is given in the following
notes where appropriate. For example, the coding for gender was male=o and female=l.
59. Racial and ethic information is not available for Tax Court judges, either in the Congressional
Directory or from the Court. Of the judges in the 136 district court cases, 120 were white, ten were AfricanAmerican, four were Asian, and two were Latino. I categorized each ethnicity separately. But cf. Brudney et al.,
supra note 3, at 1702-03 (discussing their groupings, which combined Latino and Asian judges and treated AfricanAmerican judges separately, and cautioning readers about reaching conclusions, given their small numbers of
nonwhite judges).
The coding for race was white=0, nonwhite=l.
60. [ used values created by ALEXANDER W. AS'iN, WHO GOES WHERE TO COLLEGE? 58-83 (1965). Astin
estimated the relative selectivity of an undergraduate institution by dividing the "highly able students who" wanted
"to enroll at the college ... by the number of freshmen admitted." Id at 55. A judge for whom no undergraduate
institution was reported, either because she had not attended college or did not include it in her biography, was
assigned a score of zero. Compare Bnidney et al., supra note 3. at 1703 (using Astin's measurements), with Sisk
et al., supra note 3, at 1417-29 (omitting undergraduate degree as a variable). Another method for determining the
eliteness of an undergraduate institution distinguishes between public and private institutions and between Ivy
League and other schools. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES Ch. 9 (1997).
while it might appear that Astin's method is dated, it can also be argued that (1) these criteria accurately
reflect those perceptions present when many of the judges went to college, and (2) perceptions about the eiteness
of schools change slowly. Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1703 n.104 (suggesting that the reputations of
undergraduate institutions, like law schools, change slowly and that an older list may be more appropriate because
many of the judges went to college when Astin's study was published). The latter point is even more striking in my
database than in Brudney and company's because mine includes decisions as early as 1979, while theirs included
decisions no earlier than 1986.
61. The 1977 Canter Report suggests that fifteen law schools are elite. These schools are Harvard
University, Yale University, University of California at Berkeley (Hastings), University of Chicago, Columbia
University, Cornell University, Duke University, University of Michigan, New York University, Northwestern
University, University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, University of Texas, University of California at Los
Angeles, and University of Virginia. The CanterReport on the Leading Schools of Education, Law, and Business,
CHANGE, Feb. 1977, at 44, 46. Another study would substitute three other schools for three of the fifteen Canter
Report schools. See Diana Fossum, Law Professor:A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Profession,1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 501,507 (1980) (substituting Georgetown, Iowa, and Wisconsin for Cornell, Duke, and UCLA);
see also Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1418-19 (providing authors' own list of seven schools); Brudney et al., supra
note 3, at 1703-04 (using the Canter Report without Fossum's changes and noting the slow pace at which law
school reputations have changed). I treat all eighteen of the schools discussed above as elite and the rest as non-elite.
The coding for law schools was non-elite law school=0, elite law school= 1.
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The judge's primary professional experience. Had a judge
primarily had a career in private practice, in government (such as
or on a legislative committee's staff), as a judge, or
a prosecutor 62
as a teacher?
F. The politicalparty of the president who appointed the judge.63
G. Data related to the judge's judicialcareer (length of service on the
bench at the time the case was decided)."
Data about the decision.
A. The court in which the case was decided.
B. The year of the decision.
C. The area covered by the decision (e.g., if the case involved
accounting generally, or the accrual method of accounting, and the
primary Internal Revenue Code section under scrutiny, e.g., §§
446, 451 or 461). 65
E.

II.

62. 1 treated whatever field the judge served the greatest number of years in as the judge's primary
professional experience, regardless of when this time was served. While it might be argued that the three years in
a state's attorney office served immediately before assuming the bench is more important than the ten years before
that which a judge spent in private practice, I was unwilling and unable to draw that distinction. Most judges'
careers were fairly clear, for example, where one spent most of his or her career at one or a few firms, so that he or
she could be characterized as having primary professional experience in private practice. Thus, characterizing the
primary professional experience was rarely a problem. Furthermore, I grouped careers such as work with a
corporation, as a public defender, and with a nonprofit institution as private practice. Again, most judges' careers
were fairly obvious, and they tended not to have worked for a corporation or in a public defenders office, so this
variable was not problematic.
Other authors have drawn finer distinctions, especially in judges' other government work. See, e.g.,
Bnudney et al., supra note 3, at 1704; Maule, supra note 1. at 407-13; Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1420. 1did not,
in part because Tax Court judges had substantially different experiences than district court judges (e.g., work for
the Internal Revenue Service), and simply categorizing for prior government work best accounted for these
differences. Of the total number of judges, 279 judges came from private practice, 181 from government service,
and twenty-two from both areas equally, or teaching, or being a judge. I coded background in a dichotomous
manner, with government, equal service in private practice and government, teaching or being ajudge=0 and private
practice=l.
63. Presidents who had appointed district judges were listed in the Federal Judicial Center's biographies.
See supra note 57. Presidents who had appointed Tax Court judges were not uniformly listed in the Congressional
Directory, supra note 57, but I could inevitably interpolate an answer (e.g., a judge appointed in 1985 must have
been appointed by President Reagan).
The political views of the judge herself would be an even better measure for determining the effect of
politics on decisions, but this information was not readily, and certainly not uniformly, available. Instead, the
president's politics have been used as the measure of the judge's politics. Professor Goldman suggests that
presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan appointed federal appeliate judges from their own parties over ninety percent
of the time. GOLDMAN, supra note 60, at 355-57. Only Carter, a Democrat, appointed fewer appellate judges who
were Democrats, and even his percentage of Democratic judges was over eighty-two percent. Id. at 355; see also
ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JuDiciAL PRocEss IN AMERICA 237-41 (4th ed. 1998) (supporting the
assertion that presidents have followed their political ideologies when appointing federal judges). The coding for
political party of the appointing president was Republican president=0, Democratic president=l.
64. 1 also gathered data about a judge's age when she rendered the decision in the database. Age has been
used in other studies. See Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1702 n.98. But seniority seemed to me to be a more
intuitively meaningful, influential factor than age. See Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1459-60, 1486-87 (using
seniority).
65. The cases were later catalogued by section, not by area, because the former was easier to assemble. For
discussion of the cataloging by section, see infra Part m.A.3.
A question raised by this and other variables is the accuracy of the cataloging: Has the case been
accurately described as an accounting case or as a strict construction case? See Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1410-12,
1434 (noting the difficulty of assessing opinions and safeguards employed to minimize mischaracterization). I
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D. The case's rationale.66 Possible rationales included:
1. Was it a summary decision? If so, no rationale was noted. A
summary decision was one in which the judge discussed and
probably 67even cited no cases, except in the briefest of

manners.

2.

3.

4.

Was it some other, fuller decision? If so, on which rationale
was the decision justified?
a. Strict construction of the statute."
b. Deference to the InternalRevenue Service, either to its
i. regulations,69 or
ii. another Service proclamation, such as a revenue
ruling or revenue procedure.7'
c. Reliance on the structure or purpose of the Code.7'
d. Reliance on the legislative history of the section under
scrutiny. 72
e. Practical reasoning. Inevitably, the courts relied on
decisions rendered by other courts, so a fair amount of
stare decisis was also present. But practical reasoning
also makes sense in that the courts subscribing to this
approach rendered opinions that were relatively
unstructured and practical in their approach, as opposed,
for example, to a court that relied solely on regulations
or on legislative history.73
The primary and, if appropriate, the secondary and tertiary
rationales used to explain the decision.7 Every substantive,
nonsummary, decision had at least one rationale. Some cases
had more than one rationale.
Who won.75

reduced the risk of coding bias by entering my research without preconceived ideas about the outcome of the study.
The database is in my possession and is available for inspection.
66. The method used sometimes had to be rendered into a dichotomous variable, e.g., use of practical
reasoning versus use of all other methods, use of strict construction versus use of all other methods, etc. The method
used was always coded one, and all other methods were coded zero.
67. See supra text following note 54.
68. See supra Part I.A. 1.
69. See supra Part I.A.2.
70. See supra Part I.A.2. Galler, supra note 17, at 857-69, questions whether Chevron should be applied to
Service pronouncements. The cases frequently distinguished between reliance on regulations and pronouncements,
and so I separated the two into different variables.
71. See supra Part LA.3.
72. See supra Part L.A.4.
73. See supra Part I.A.5.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
75. Sometimes the winner was clear, sometimes it was not. In cases where only one issue was before the
court, a decision stated by the court to be in favor of the government or against the taxpayer was treated as a
decision in favor of the government; conversely, a decision stated by the court to be in favor of the taxpayer or
against the government was treated as a decision in favor of the taxpayer. Even if the "winner," as just defined, did
not obtain from the court everything the taxpayer had sought, e.g., the government "won" only sixty percent of the
taxes it claimed the taxpayer owed, that party was still treated as the winner.
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B. StatisticalAnalysis
I sampled cases from the Tax Court and three district courts in order to be
able to contrast differences, if any, between two of the major forums of federal tax
6
litigation and district courts in three different cities. It is axiomatic that one should
litigate in the court that presents the most favorable precedent.' Our federal tax
system also permits one to choose whether to pay the 7tax and seek a refund in the
district court, or not to pay and litigate in the Tax Court. Therefore, choosing these
two different types of courts enabled me to test for variables, other than precedent,
that could enter into a decision-such as the judge's presumed politics,79educational
background, and gender-to see if they made a difference in outcome.
Finally, I selected the district courts encompassing Los Angeles, Chicago,
and New York City because I thought that, as courts in major metropolitan areas,
they would offer a breadth of cases that would be at least as sophisticated as those
drawn from other district courts. I also chose to review cases over a twenty-year
period in order to minimize the risk of transitory aberrations and to offer a greater
breadth of diversity-about gender, race/ethnicity, and approaches to interpreting
statutes-than a shorter time span would allow.
Independent, or explanatory, variables included the judge's sex, years on the
bench when the sampled case was decided, the appointing president's political party,
eliteness of college and law school, primary professional experience before
ascending to the bench, and, on the district courts, race/ethnicity. The dependent, or
outcome, variable was the method of interpreting the Code section at issue with
which the judge justified her decision in nonsummary cases.
Statistical significance for relationships created through comparisons
between judges on the Tax Court and on the district courts (e.g., Table 1) was

I resolved multiple-issue cases cautiously, much the same as I had single-issue cases where the winner

might have obtained less than the full recovery the taxpayer had sought For example, a party that had won on the
more important issue but lost on a lesser issue (or issues) was still coded as the winner.

76. In addition to the reasons noted in the text, I did not choose the third forum, the Court of Federal Claims,
because it is the only tax forum for which appeal is to a particular circuit, the Federal Circuit. In contrast, a Tax
Court or district court decision could be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals, so that a taxpayer in Chicago
would appeal to the Seventh Circuit or a taxpayer in New York City to the Second Circuit. See IRC § 7482(a)(1)
(1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1295(a)(3) (1994). Therefore, the greater scope of appellate review was less likely to

lead to more homogenous trial court decisions. The greater breadth of courts comprising the district courts also
made them a more compelling case for study than the Court of Federal Claims.

77. See, e.g., KAFKA & CAVANAUGH, supra note 55, at Ch. I (discussing where to litigate tax cases);
Michael C. Durney, Tax Litigation 1972-1992: A Retrospective, 57 TAx NoTES 885, 886 (1992) (reviewing tax
litigation culled from Internal Revenue Service figures); Marvin J. Garbis & Robert L Frome, Selecting the Court
for the Optimum Dispositionof a Tax Controversy, 27 J. TAX'N 216 (1967) (examining factors to consider in tax
litigation); Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where It Is Going, 44 REC.
ASS'N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 825 (1989) (examining tax litigation in light of proposals to centralize tax litigation).
78. CompareIRC § 6213(a) (1994) (describing Tax Courtjurisdiction), with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994)
(describing district court jurisdiction).
79. Choosing multiple district courts enabled me to contrast one with another, if that became appropriate.
Differences among the district courts are noted. See Table 2A infra Appendix. For example, judges in the Central
District of California led in elite college educations and percentage of women on the bench, judges in the Southern
District of New York led in elite law school educations, and judges in the Northern District of Illinois led in
appointments by Democratic presidents. Limited resources precluded me from engaging in further assessments.
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established through statistically appropriate tests.8' I used logistic regression to
establish relationships between independent and dependent variables. Logistic
regression permits the effect of each independent variable to be isolated while
controlling for other influences. This method also facilitates the measurement of the
magnitude of the influence.8 ' Logistic regression, therefore, is well suited for the
multivariate analysis of dichotomous, dependent variables undertaken in this article.
IMI. RESULTS
A. Who Were the Judges and How Did They Justify Their Decisions?
Analysis of the sampled cases revealed a number of facts about the judges,
the approaches they used in the cases before them, and about the influence of social
background.

1. Judges' Characteristics
Table 182 parses the judges who decided the cases by various characteristics,
both as a group and by the Tax Court alone and the district courts alone.
The judges who decided the 482 sampled cases were mostly male 3 and, at
least on the district court, mostly white. A majority of these judges had engaged
primarily in private practice and had been on the bench for more than twelve years
before deciding the sampled case. Slightly less than half had been appointed by
Democratic presidents, and slightly less than half also had gone to elite law schools.
The main differences between the two courts are noted below.
* The judges in the 136 district court cases were drawn from more elite
law schools and less elite colleges than the judges in the 346 Tax Court
cases.
* The Tax Court judges were more senior than the district court judges.
* District court judges were more likely to be drawn from private
practice, academia, and the judiciary, while more Tax Court judges had
previous experience working for the government.'

80. The X2 test was used for cross-tabulations of discrete variables (e.g., gender, method of construction).
Differences between the means were used to establish significance for continuous data (e.g., years on the bench
when deciding the case), and the Wald test was used for logistic regression. Statistical significance is "designed to
allow us to make statements about the probability that hypothetical relationships actually occur;" it permits the
inference that two variables are related-in the population and in the sample--and not merely the result of random
association. GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT & DAVID KNOKE, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 22-23, 158 (3d
ed. 1994); Schneider, supra note 2, at 492 n.20. See generally Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1709 n.121
(discussing 0.05 level of testing for significance and 0.10 level for approaching significance).
81. Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1680.
82. In this and all following tables, the number of cases that comprises the percentage is set forth in
parentheses. Thus, 217 of the judges in the 482 cases, or forty-five percent, attended elite law schools.
83. See Table IA infra Appendix (setting forth additional data about the differences revealed by the sex of
the judges). This table reveals that women were frequently junior to their male colleagues, attended less elite
colleges and law schools, had lesser tenure when deciding cases, and came from private practice less often than men.
They came from teaching, being a judge, or from private practice and government at least as often as men did and
were more likely to have been appointed by Republican than Democratic presidents.
84. Other data may be of interest, even though not included in the analysis. The average (mean) ages of the
judges were as follows: all judges, 59.78 years old; judges appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents,
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TABLE 1. JUDGES' CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristic

Both
Courts
Combined

Tax
Court
(N=346)

District
Courts
(N-136)

59.46
45% (217)

60.18

57.60
59% (80)

11.69
years
14% (66)

12.73
years
13% (44)

9.05
years
16% (22)

45% (215)

45%

43% (59)

(N482)
Mean score of "Astin" number
for college' attended*
Percent that attended elite law
schools*
Mean of tenure when rendering
sampled decision**
Percent ofjudges who were
women
Percent appointed by

(156)

Democratic presidents

Experience before becoming
judge in:*

38%(181)

45%

20%(27)

(154)

a) government

b) private practice

40%
(137)

58% (279)

53%

70% (95)

(184)
c) other: both activities
10% (14)
2% (8)
5% (22)
equally, teacher, judge, etc.
Ethnicity-percent who were
12%(16)
not whitet
See supra note 56 (discussing Astin's formula for measuring college
eliteness). This comparison of the means assumes equal variances, as does
the comparison of the means of tenure. KRISTN E. VOELKL & SUSAN B.
GERBER, USING SPSS FOR WINDOWS: DATA ANALYSIS AND GRAPHICS
Ch. 12 (1999).

*p<.lO

**p<. 0 5
tp not applicable

56.66 and 63.62 years old, respectively;, male and female judges, 60.59 and 54.65 years old, respectively, Tax Court
and district court judges, 60.02 and 59.17 years old, respectively;, and white and nonwhite district court judges,
59.58 and 56.13 years old, respectively.
When each case was decided, the length of tenure of the judge deciding the case ranged from one
year-the tenure ofjudges in forty cases--up to forty-six years, the tenure of a judge in only one case. When a case
was decided, the youngest age of the presiding judge was forty-one and the oldest age was eighty-eight More of
the judges were younger, e.g., no more than fifty years old (twenty-one percent), than older, e.g., eighty years or
older (three percent). For a summary of data in another study about Tax Court judges and their professional
backgrounds, see Maule, supra note 1, at 408-13.
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All of these observations were statistically significant-or at least approached
significance. Only sex and the political party of the appointing president lacked any
type of statistical significance.
2. Judges' Justifications When Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code
What approaches did judges use when explaining decisions in the 431
sampled, substantive, cases that required analysis of the Internal Revenue Code? In
examining the database to determine what approach judges used, I found that 431
cases had at least one approach to statutory construction, 206 had a second approach
to it, and 43 cases had a. third approach. Table 2" sets forth the primary approach
used in these cases (e.g., how many cases were explained by the court's primary
reliance on structure, on strict construction, etc.).
What do these statistics tell us about the judges' approaches to interpreting
the Internal Revenue Code in the sampled cases? First, Table 2 reveals that judges
rely on diverse approaches. While commentators, in arguing for a particular
approach for theoretical reasons, implicitly argue for that approach's exclusive use
as well,"7 even the diverse approaches encompassed by practical reasoning do not
seem to permit judges to rely exclusively on just one of the approaches. Each
commentator gains some support from the data-and because two thirds of all cases
rely primarily on practical reasoning, Livingston gains the most support-but no one
method is used exclusively.
Table 2 also shows that the judges strongly favor nonliteral approaches,
especially practical reasoning. Judges in the district court cases relied on practical
reasoning even more than judges in the Tax Court cases. Perhaps the greater breadth
of the subject matter jurisdiction that district court judges face leads them to justify
decisions more pragmatically than judges on the Tax Court, with its narrower
jurisdiction. Alternatively, perhaps Tax Court judges feel more comfortable with
sophisticated approaches. The approaches other than practical reasoning are not
unique to tax and should not differentiate the two courts. Still, the expertise Tax
Court judges possess regarding tax might lead to their greater reliance on approaches
other than practical reasoning."

85. The non-continuous variables in Table 2 were tested to see whether the different groups noted in Table

, .g., men versus women, Republican versus Democratic appointees, approached interpreting the Internal Revenue
Code differently. While some differences were to be expected-for example, judges with law degrees from elite
schools used practical reasoning fifty-six percent of the time, while those from non-efite schools used this method
forty-four percent of the time-the differences were never statistically significant. Therefore, these differences are
not set forth.
86. The values in the columns are set forth in percentages.
87. See supra Part IA; see also Coverdale, supra note 6 and accompanying text (arguing against any
nonliteral interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, leaving only strict construction); Livingston, supra note 12,
at 683-87 (arguing against purposivism in promoting practical reasoning).
88.

Cf Sandra Jo Craig, Federal Income Tax and the Supreme Court: The Case Against a National Court

of Tax Appeals, 1983 UTAH L REv. 679, 680-85 (summarizing arguments for a national court of tax appeals,
including expert knowledge of judges on such a court). But cf.Livingston, supra note 12, at 683-87 (arguing that
tax is not a special area).
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TABLE 2. PRIMARY APPROACH USED**

Both Courts
Combined

Tax Court
(Nf334)

District Courts
(N=97)

Strict construction
Nonliteral
interpretation:
practical
reasoning

6% (25)

7% (22)

3% (3)

66% (283)

60% (200)

86% (83)

Legislative
history
Regulations

9% (37)

10% (34)

3% (3)

12% (50)

14% (47)

3% (3)

2% (8)
6% (27)

2% (6)
8% (25)

2% (2)
2% (2)

Approach

(N=431)

Other IRS
pronouncements
Structure
**p<. 05

The tables contrasting each case's primary approach against other,
subsequent approaches have been placed in an appendix to this article due to their
lengths.8 9 Review of these tables underscores the practicality judges used to explain
their interpretations of the Code. Judges often rendered substantive decisions using
a second approach on top of the first.90 Because judges should not be able to
construe a statute both literally and nonliterally, one surprising finding is that strict
construction is frequently associated with other approaches. Review of these tables
shows that practical reasoning was a popular second approach, and, to a lesser
extent, legislative history as well. 9'

89. See Tables 3A-8A infra Appendix.
90. The type of case in which a second approach was least likely to be used was the practical reasoning
cases, where only thirty-one percent (89/283) ofthe cases had a second approach. The next closest primary approach
was strict construction, where sixty-eight percent of the cases had a second approach.
91. I did not catalogue the cases for the occurrence of single versus multiple issues. Assuming that some of
the sampled cases were multiple-issue cases, this might explain multiple approaches used by the same court It
seems reasonable to conclude that not all the sampled cases were multiple-issue decisions; in which case, use of
multiple approaches by a court faced with a single issue suggests a relaxed approach to interpreting the Code. Even
if a sampled case was a multiple-issue decision, the other possibility--use of a different approach for each
issue-still reveals a more relaxed approach to interpreting the Code than the literature would suggest See Sisk et
al., supra note 3 (reviewing the approach to statutory construction in single-issue cases).
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3. Areas of the Decisions
When I catalogued the sampling by specific reference to the primary Code
section at issue,92 the cases dispersed as indicated in Table 3.93
TABLE 3. AREAS OF SAMPLED CASES

Type of Case

Both
Courts
Combined

Tax Court
(N= 308)

District
Courts (N--99)

(N=407)
Individual

32%(132)

38%(118)

14% (14)

Compensation
Accounting

3% (14)
6%(25)

4% (12)
8%(24)

2% (2)
1%(1)

Exempt

5%(22)

6%(19)

3%(3)

11% (46)
5%(20)

14% (42)
5%(16)

4% (4)
4%(4)

4%(15)

5%(14)

1%(1)

Capital assets

4%(15)

5%(14)

1%(1)

Procedure or
criminal

29% (118)

16% (49)

70% (69)

organizations
Business tax
Estate
planning
Foreign tax

Two aspects of Table 3 worth noting are the dispersion of the cases' subject
areas and the courts in which the cases were litigated. Most of the cases were
individual or procedural/criminal cases (thirty-two and twenty-nine percent of all
cases), and a greater percentage of the district courts' cases were procedural or
criminal than the Tax Court's (seventy and sixteen percent, respectively).
92. I necessarily made choices about how to group Code sections. Some groupings were easier to make, such
as "foreign tax," which, among the catalogued cases, included §§ 861-994, and § 1402. Other groupings were more
difficult to categorize, such as §§ 41-280, and §§ 1001-1031, for example, which I characterized as "individual."
Sections of the Code were organized as follows, and those groupings appear as row captions in Table
3: (1) individual, §§ 41-280, 1001-1031; (2) compensation, §§ 401-422, 3121,4973-75; (3) accounting, §§ 448-82,
1341-48; (4) exempt organizations, §§ 501-12, 4911-45; (5) business tax, §§ 301-68, 533-613, 702-818, 1366-72,
1502,4081-4481,4987-97; (6) estate planning, §§ 641-75,2013-2518; (7) foreign tax, §§ 861-994, 1402; (8) capital
assets, §§ 1211-81; (9) procedure or criminal, §§ 6012-7609. The exclusion of a section from this list, such as § 1,
means that § I was not at issue, or primarily at issue, in any sampled case. The presence of a section at the beginning
or end of a group means that it was at issue, and the inclusion of a section somewhere within a group does not
necessarily mean that it was primarily at issue in any case either. For example, among the "individual" Code
sections, both § 41 and § 280 were at issue at least once; § 61 and § 71 also were at issue, but §§ 62,63, and 72 were
not.
As noted above, the data was not catalogued for single versus multiple issues. See supra Part m.A.2.
Nevertheless, it is my impression that even multiple-issue cases were more likely to revolve around a single area,
such that the presence of multiple issues had a less adverse impact on the discussion of the area than the topic of
the secondary approach to interpreting the Code used by a court.
93. The study population is made up of 482 cases. The column values are set forth in percentages. Four
hundred and seven cases could be characterized by Code section. Seventy-five had no predominate Code section
because they were about discovery or some other non-tax matter. Of these seventy-five, the Tax Court decided
thirty-eight, and thirty-seven were decided by the district courts.
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Theoretically, the preponderance of district court cases in the procedural/criminal
area might be attributable to its exclusive jurisdiction over criminal tax matters, 9' but
only two district court cases dealt primarily with criminal tax statutes. Thus, the
table reveals litigants' preference for resolving procedural matters in the district
court. Arguably, litigants might also turn to the Tax Court, with its presumed
expertise in tax matters, for areas requiring specialized knowledge, such as business
planning (fourteen and four percent of all Tax Court and district court cases,
respectively), and the statistics bear out that conclusion. But other areas requiring
expertise, such as estate planning (five percent of all Tax Court and four percent of
all district court cases), contradict the suggestion that litigants turn to the Tax Court
for its skill in tax matters.
Less can be said about the meaning of the subject areas of the sampled
cases. A benefit of the single-subject Sentencing Reform Act study is that it was a
more controlled experiment than this one, which examined diverse cases over a
broad spectrum of issues."5 The large number of individual or procedural/criminal
tax cases could not be easily characterized as inherently factual and, therefore, more
likely to lead to litigation than other issues like capital assets or compensation. Even
a highly structured area, such as business tax, has its pockets of factual
inquiry-debt versus equity for example. Thus it is difficult to generalize about the
subject areas of the cases. 9
Table 497 sets forth the use of different approaches to interpretation of the
Code in each of the enumerated subject matter topics. It illuminates whether 'certain
primary approaches were used more by judges examining issues in one area than in
others.
Judges justified their decisions with practical reasoning in all areas. This
should not be surprising, given the overwhelming primary reliance on the practical
reasoning approach. 98The more interesting results reflected in this table are the areas
in which other approaches appear. For example, deference to regulations was used
more in accounting, exempt organizations, business tax, and foreign tax, a result
consistent with the popular perception that these areas are highly regulated.
Legislative history was used more in foreign tax, capital assets, exempt
organizations, and compensation. Structure was used more in compensation and
estate planning. Strict construction was used more in foreign tax and estate planning.

94. 18 U.S.C.

§

3231, 3237(b) (1994) (giving district courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes and

providing venue for tax crimes, respectively).

95. See supra note 48.
96. See, e.g., BORIS 1.BrrrKER &JAMEs S. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND

SHAREHOLDERS 4.03 (6th ed. 1998) (discussing differences between debt and equity); William T. Plumb, Jr., The

Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysisand a Proposal, 26 TAX L REV. 369

(1970-71) (reviewing how case law distinguishes between debt and stock).
The areas of the sampled cases contrast with the topics about which people have written. In a study of
articles during a forty-five year period in some of the more significant tax journals, the most frequently analyzed
area seems to have been business tax; litigation, which included procedural and criminal tax matters, was the subject
of far fewer articles. See Schneider, supra note 2,at 519-523.
97. Populations and percentages are given for each row. Information about the relative number of cases using
different primary approaches is set forth in Table 2, supra Part II.A.2 (using primary approach).
98. See Table 2 supra Part ffl.A.2.
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B. Logistic Regressions-Why Judges Used Different Interpretations
The effect of independent variables on dependent, dichotomous variables

is best ascertained using logistic regression." In my analysis, the five different
primary methods of statutory construction with which judges explained their
decisions made up my dependent variables.'O" I performed regressions on each
dependent variable for the Tax Court alone, for the district courts alone, and for all

courts combined.
My independent variables were gender, years on the bench when the
decision was rendered, the appointing president's political party, education (both
undergraduate and law school), the judge's primary experience before ascending to
the bench (in private practice, government, or elsewhere), and, for district court
judges, race/ethnicity.'0 ' Because there are so many dependent variables, and they
are used in regressions for three sets of courts, only the relationships that are

statistically significant or approaching significance are noted below. te

Tables 5 and 6 examine practical reasoning as the primary method of
interpretation. When both courts were combined, there were no associations between
that method and any independent variable. When the courts were examined
separately, these tables show that the only independent variable that could be

associated with use of practical reasoning as the primary method of interpretation

was the elite nature of the judge's college education. An elite college education had
a negative impact on Tax Court judges' use of practical reasoning (Table 50),

99. See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 3; Sisk et al., supra note 3.
100. Each dependent variable consisted of one type of construction as opposed to all other methods. For
example, one dependent variable (practical reasoning) was coded one, while all other methods (strict construction,
legislative history, regulations and other Internal Revenue Service pronouncements, and structure) were coded zero.
Each dependent variable needed a dichotomy in order to facilitate analysis.
101. For descriptions of these variables, see supra Part I.A.2. These variables, or ones like them, have been
used in other studies. See Brudney et al., supra note 3; Sisk et al., supra note 3.
Multicollinearity was not problematic here. See Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1432, n.233, (suggesting "no firm 'rule'
exists" about what constitutes collinearity and choosing to adopt a model excluding independent variables, the
bivariate correlation of which exceeded.500). None of the correlations between independent variables in regressions
for both courts exceeded +/- .372; none exceeded +/. .426 in regressions for the Tax Court, and none exceeded +/.339 in regressions for the district courts.
102. Thus, for example, none of the other independent variables, like gender or appointing president's politics,
could be associated with the dependent variable of primary use of the practical reasoning method for the Tax Court.
Nor could any of the independent variables be associated with the dependent variable of primary use of the practical
reasoning method for both types of courts combined.
103. The population of this regression and all of the following regressions involving the Tax Court is
comprised of 334 cases; the population for regressions involving the district courts is made up of ninety-seven cases,
and the population for regressions involving both courts combined is comprised of 431 cases. In every regression,
the approach indicated in the caption to the table--practical reasoning, for example, in Tables 5 and 6-is coded
one and all other approaches are coded zero.
The columns labeled "P" and "Exp ()" state the same fact differently. Beta (3) indicates the effect of
an independent variable on the logarithmic probability of the dependent variable occurring. A number in the
exponentiated beta (Exp (pi)) of more than one indicates that something is more likely to occur than not, and a
number of less than one indicates that it is less likely to occur than not. All of the tables except Table 8 are single,
independent variable cases. Thus, in Table 8, the table involving two independent variables, both eliteness of college
and prior professional experience (specifically in private practice) led to the lesser likelihood that the district court
would use regulations or other Service pronouncements. See Table 8 infra Part tll.B. As between these two
variables, a judge's having primarily prior private practice experience was even less likely to lead to use of
regulations or other Service pronouncements than having gone to an elite college, either because the prior
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leading them to avoid practical reasoning, and the contrary effect on district court
judges, causing them to use this approach (Table 6).
TABLE 5. LOGISTIC REGRESSION: PRIMARY USE OF PRACTICAL
REASONING BY THE TAX COURT
Independent Variable

Standard
Error

I

Significance

Exp (l)

.029
.969
-.031 .014
Eliteness-college"
'The more elite a college was, the higher its score. See supra note 56.
TABLE 6. LOGISTIC REGRESSION: PRIMARY USE OF PRACTICAL
REASONING BY DISTRICT COURTS
Independent
Variable
Eliteness--college

.036

Standard
Error

Significance

Exp (p)

.014

.011

1.036

Tables 7 and 8 review the primary use of regulations/pronouncements. Like
practical reasoning, no association existed between the primary use of regulations
and other Internal Revenue Service pronouncements when the Tax Court and the
district courts were combined. When the two courts are viewed separately, however,
length of tenure had a negative impact on Tax Court judges' use of this approach
(Table 7"°4). An elite college education had a negative impact on district court
judges' use of this approach, and primary professional experience before becoming
a judge-other than in private practice-had an even stronger negative impact on
them (Table 8)."os
These findings are restated below.
* The only methods of interpretation influenced by social background
were practical reasoning and deference to regulations/pronouncements.
* With reference to practical reasoning:
o Controlling for all other independent variables, Tax Court judges
who had more elite college educations were more likely to avoid
practical reasoning.
o District court judges who had elite college educations were more
likely to explain their decisions using practical reasoning.

experience beta was lower than the elite college beta, or because the prior experience exponentiated beta was lower

than the elite college exponentiated beta.
104. There were too few cases--only eight-in "Other Internal Revenue Service Pronouncements" to give
an accurate regression. See Table 2 supra Part m.A.2. Therefore, these cases were combined with the fifty
"Regulation" cases in order to run the logistic regression.
105. Again, there were too few cases, so regulations and pronouncements were combined. See supra note 104.
See supra note 103 (indicating that such prior experience would have been in government, as a judge or teacher,
or equally in government and private practice).
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TABLE 7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION: PRIMARY USE OF REGULATIONS
OR OTHER INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRONOUNCEMENTS BY
THE TAX COURT
Independent Variable
-.032

Length of tenurea

Standard
Error

Significance

Exp (P)

.020

.107 b

.969

The longer the judge had served on the bench, the higher was the number of
,ears in the length of tenure variable. See supranote 64.
Length of tenure fails to approach significance by 0.07%, but I have included
this variable anyway to view the data more expansively.
TABLE 8. LOGISTIC REGRESSION: PRIMARY USE OF REGULATIONS OR
OTHER INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRONOUNCEMENTS BY THE
DISTRICT COURTS
Independent Variable

fi

Standard
Error

Significance

Exp (P).

Eliteness--college

-.040

.024

.095

.960

Prior professional
experience (not private
practice=0, private
practice=l)

-2.511

1.439

.081

.081

With reference to reliance on regulations or Service pronouncements:
o Controlling for all other independent variables, Tax Court judges
were less likely to rely on regulations/ pronouncements as they
became more senior.
o District court judges who had more elite college educations were
less likely to give deference to regulations and pronouncements.
This tendency is even more pronounced in district court cases
decided by judges whose primary work before becoming a judge
was in the government, as a judge, as a teacher, or equally split
between private practice and government work. Stated somewhat
differently, district court judges were less likely to rely on
regulations or pronouncements as the primary interpretive
approach if they had less elite college educations or had come
from a "non-private practice" prior work experience.
C. Interpreting the Logistic Regressions
Other authors who have used logistic regression to analyze the relationship
between social background factors and judges' decisions have concluded that such
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factors have some "effect" on judicial reasoning.' 06 The preceding analysis suggests
that the following social background factors may be at play in outcomes in this
article's database.
1. Education
Education broadcasts socioeconomic signals. Undergraduate education has
long been perceived as a socioeconomic marker, and even legal education has been
viewed similarly, although in a more attenuated manner."7 Students attending more
elite colleges tend to come from more privileged backgrounds than those who study
at other colleges.' 8
Here, district court judges with more elite college educations used practical
reasoning and avoided giving deference to regulations and other Internal Revenue
Service pronouncements. The effect of undergraduate education on the district court
judge's choice of interpretive method is consistent with Sisk, Heise, and Morriss's
observation that elite law school education does not lead to conceptual decision
making. They found that judges with elite law school educations applied practical
reasoning in making sentencing decisions. This finding surprised them because they
had expected judges from elite law schools to favor conceptual reasoning.' They
conclude that "this finding undermines the hypothesis that judges educated at elite
law schools are more attracted towards conceptual reasoning than judges educated
at non-elite law schools."" 0 Arguably, because both types of degrees mark
socioeconomic standing, willingness to use practical reasoning could rest with either
marker.
If practical reasoning can be characterized as non-abstract, then it follows
other area in which undergraduate education was important--deference to
the
that
regulations or other Service pronouncements in district court cases-is more
abstract. The regression coefficient in this latter area is negative, so district court
judges with elite educations were less likely to rely primarily on regulations and
other Service pronouncements.
On the other hand, the opposite result in the practical reasoning area among
judges in the Tax Court cases negates these observations. A less elite college
education is associated with Tax Court judges' primary reliance on the practical
reasoning approach. Certainly, the opposing regressions in the two types of courts
simply may not be reconcilable. If they are, however, a way in which to rationalize
106. See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 3,at 1761 ("Notwithstanding ... [several] caveats, our analysis has
identified numerous personal, political, and professional background factors that are significantly associated with
a judge's propensity to support or reject the union's legal position."); Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1498-99 ("as is
often the case with empirical research, our study provides both comfort and challenges to all camps.. .the behavioral
model is simultaneously bolstered and buffeted").
107. For brevity, I have emphasized these two articles as points of reference in the text. There is, however,
a wealth of additional literature, some of which I have also noted. The literature is exhaustively reviewed in Brudney
etal., supra note 3, at 1739-59, and Sisk et al., supra note 3. at 1451-98. For an article in which legal education was
found to be important, see Gerard S.Gryski & Eleanor C. Main, Social Backgrounds as Predictorsof Votes on State

Courts ofLast Resort: The Case of Sex Discrimination, 39 W. POt.. Q. 528, 532 (1986) (finding that judges were
more liberal if they had attended public or out-of-state law schools).
108. See, e.g., Brudney et a., supra note 3, at 1750-51 nn.228-29 (citing various sources).
supra note 3, at 1464.
109. Sisk et al.,
110. Id. at 1465.
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them is to note the source of the socioeconomic marking. Eliteness in law schoolspossessed by the judges on the district courts more than on the Tax Court--arguably
promotes non-abstract reasoning, while that eliteness in college-possessed by the
judges on the Tax Court more than on the district courts"l--negates non-abstract
reasoning. This logic, however, is tortured, and literature does not reinforce such a
conclusion.
2. Seniority
Seniority led Tax Court judges to give less deference to regulations and
pronouncements. Perhaps seniority might lead to a diminishing desire to follow the
strictures of regulations or other Service pronouncements, at least relative to other
methods of interpreting the Code. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the
limited research, both in law and in social science, regarding the effect of age or
seniority on how judges decide." 2
3. Prior Work Experience
Judges were less likely to use regulations or other pronouncements when
they had worked for the government (the greatest number in this group), taught at
a law school, been a judge, or worked equally for the government and in private
practice before becoming district court judges. Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt's
findings that management-side experience tended to lead to a judge's later support
of the union position" 3 echoes this discovery. They believe that the NLRB's
history-its enactment during the New Deal and its fostering of collective
action-"may signify that familiarity with the Act breeds greater respect for its
protective doctrinal scope.""" In tax, however, familiarity appears to have bred
contempt.
4. Gender
There was no association between the method of statutory construction
employed and a judge's sex. Differences between the sexes might have been
expected because, for example, of Professor Carol Gilligan's "different voice"
theory that women view themselves as more community-oriented, while men tend
to view themselves as more autonomous." 5 Professor Suzanna Sherry's assertion of
111. See Table I supra Part IMl.A. 1.
112. Compare Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1486-87 (finding that more senior judges did not increasingly
uphold sentencing guidelines), with Brudney et al., supra note 3. at 1755 n.238 (finding that age was significant,
reinforcing the "adage that with old age comes a reluctance to deviate from the status quo"); see also Sue Davis et
al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 133 (1990) (stating that the
age of a judge affects the outcome of a case); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 491, 499 (1975) (finding that age made appellate judges more
conservative, but not in the "government fiscal" area, which included tax); Gryski & Main, supranote 107 (noting
modest evidence that age affects judges' decisions).
113. See Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1741-50.
114. Id. at 1745; see also id. at 1471-74. For an example of a social science article where prior career
experience was important, see C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal
Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. ScI. 460 (1991).
115. CAROL GI.uGAN, IN ADIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982).
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a feminine attitude in which women stress "relationships to others," while men
6
emphasize "rights" might have led to the same expectation." Studies about the
impact of gender on judges' decisions7 are divided in their conclusions, some
perceiving a difference and others, not."
As has been observed,
[w]hether because gender-based theories of differences are wrong or overstated,
because thejudicial recruitment process selects only women compatible with the
views of the appointing president, or because "differences between men and
women judges are neutralized by the very nature of law and legal process,"
"[t]he weight of the evidence demonstrates that most female judges do not
decide cases in a distinctively feminist or feminine manner.""'
The same might be said of sex and methods of interpretation used to justify
judges' federal tax decisions. Tax cases may present few opportunities for a
distinctly feminine or feminist point of view." 9 At best, justifying decisions in tax
cases is a complicated area in which a feminine or feminist approach cannot easily
be applied.
5. Race
My study did not reveal any relationship between race and reasoning in tax
case decisions. Despite the importance of race in other empirical researchespecially in the social sciences-it might, like gender, not be easily imported into
tax cases."2 In other words, the importance of race in how judges sentence criminal

116. Suzanna Sherry. Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543,582 (1982); see also Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking FeministJudging,70 IND. L. 891
(1995) (reviewing literature about effect of gender on judging and arguing for more women judges).
supra note 3, at 1756-59 (finding that gender affected outcome among
117. Compare Brudney et al.,
Republican women), with Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1451-54 (finding that gender had no influence).
Social science literature has also been divided about the effect of gender. See, e.g., Davis, supra note
112, at 133 (finding that male and female judges act differently in employment discrimination cases, but not obscenity cases); John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers:The Case of TrialJudges, 25 AM. J.POL. Sci. 308 (1981)
(noting that male and female judges act the same, e.g., in leniency of sentence, but differently, e.g., when sentencing
male and female defendants). Most articles focus on how judges act in the criminal area. One article concluded that
female judges supported federal economic regulation more than their male colleagues. See Thomas G. Walker &
Deborah J.Barrow, The Diversificationof the FederalBench: Policyand Process Ramifications, 47 J.POL. 596,
614 (1985). That finding contrasts with the conclusion here that sex had no impact on interpreting the Code.
118. See Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1453-54 (footnotes omitted).
119. But see Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretationof Tax Statutes, 3
UCLA WOMEN'S L. 39 (1993) (discussing interplay between "feminism" and statutory construction). See also
Symposium, Critical Tax Theory: Criticismand Response, 76 N.C. L REV. 1519 (1998) [hereinafter Symposium]
(recounting recent debate about tax and feminism).
120. There is limited research about tax and race. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 2. Compare Sisk et al.,
supra note 3, at 1453-54 (finding minority judges more likely to invalidate guidelines, but no association between
race and outcome), with Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1755 (finding African-American judges more likely to
support a union than white judges, but no association between race and outcomes). See generally Symposium, supra
note 119 (recounting recent debate about tax and critical race theory). There are, however, more numerous examples
of social science literature dealing with the impact of race. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisionsof
Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 L Soc. 1197, 1206-08 (1990) (finding that
black and white judges generally do not sentence criminal defendants differently); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite
Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 Am.J. POL. Sct. 884, 893 (1978) (finding that black and white
judges come from the same elite legal background); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32
AM. J.POL. So. 126, 134 (1988) (finding that black and white judges do sentence criminal defendants differently).
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defendants notwithstanding, the race of the judge does not matter when interpreting
the Code. As with gender, perhaps a judge's race is neutralized by the nature of the
legal process, especially in tax.
6. Politics
Finally, there was no relationship between politics and outcome. Like race,
politics has been an important factor in other empirical research about how judges
decide issues, especially in the social sciences. While tax is not free from politics,
its failure to influence the methods of construction judges use to justify their
decisions suggests that politics, like gender, may simply be neutralized by the legal
process."'
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Articles about interpreting the Internal Revenue Code consistently theorize
about using particular approaches. Theory is certainly important, but it cannot
explain who the judges are who have interpreted the Code, how ,they have
interpreted it, or why they have justified their decisions with the approaches they
have used.
The judges who decided the cases in this database were mostly men, drawn
more frequently from private practice than government work, somewhat more likely
to have been appointed by a Republican than a Democratic president and, on the
district court, overwhelmingly white. Nonliteral modes of interpretation, especially
practical reasoning, were favored by these judges, and practical reasoning was
favored more by judges on the district courts than on the Tax Court. Some social
background factors-college education, seniority, and prior practice-played into
judges' decisions, and the presence of these factors may explain, in a way that
traditional legal analysis does not, judges' choices about interpreting the Internal
Revenue Code.

121. Neither Brudney et al., supra note 3, at 1737-39, nor Sisk et al., supra note 3, at 1465, found any
association between a judge's politics and outcome. Social science literature, however, frequently finds politics to
be important. See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative
Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277,280 (1988) (ffinding ajudge's politics
important); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 54 (1986) (same); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence
of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165 (1983)
(same); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843 (1961) (same);
Donald S. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 1955-1986,43 W. POL. Q. 317 (1990) (same); Tate & Handberg, supra note 114 (same).
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APPENDIX
Table IA sets forth judges' characteristics by sex. In each cell, women's
statistics have been set forth first; then men's statistics are set forth in brackets.
References "only for women" or "only for men" are intended to indicate statistical
significance. For example, "/o appointed by Democratic presidents**, only for women"
means that statistical significance was found only for the women judges appointed by
Democratic presidents.
TABLE IA. JUDGES' CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristic

Both Courts
Combined (N=482)

Tax Court
(N=346)

District Courts
(N=136)

Percent ofjudges
who were women

14% (66) [86%
(416)]

13% (44)
[87% (302)]

16% (22) [84%
(114)]

Mean score of
"Astin" number for
college attended*,
only for women

57.79 [59.72]

59.95 [60.22]

53.45 [58.40]

Percent attended elite
law schools**

39% (26) [46%
(191)]

30% (13)
[41% (124)]

59% (13) [59%
(67)]

Mean of tenure when

9.05 years [12.12

11.27 years

4.59 years [9.92

rendering sampled

years]

[12.94 years]

years]

Percent appointed by
Democratic
presidents**, only for
women

23% (15) [48%
(200)]

11% (5)
[50% (151)]

46% (10) [43%
(49)]

Percent appointed by

77% (51) [52%

89% (39)

55% (12) [57%

Republican
presidents*", only for

(216)]

[50% (151)]

(65)]

38% (25) [38%

43% (19)

27% (6)

(156)]

[45% (135)]

[18% (21)]

[men]

decision**

women
Experience before
becoming judge in:
**

only for men

a) government
* p<.10
** p_5. 0 5

t p not applicable
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TABLE 1A (CONTINUED)

b) private practice

46% (30) [60%
(249)]

39% (17)
[55% (167)]

59% (8) [72%
(82)]

c) other: both
activities

equally, teacher,

17% (11) [3% (11)]

18%(8)

14% (3) [10%

[]

(11)]

judge

Ethnicity-percent

18% (4)

who were not whitet

[10% (12)]

Ethnicity-percent
who were whitet
10
* p<.
** p<.0 5

82% (18)
[90% (102)]

t p not applicable
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Table 2A sets forth judges' characteristics for the different district courts.
TABLE 2A. JUDGES' CHARACTERISTICS BY DISTRICT COURT
Characteristic/Court

C.D. Cal.

N.D. Ill.

S.D.N.Y.

59.26

55.39

58.91

schools*

37% (13)

56% (30)

79% (37)

Percent women

20% (7)

13% (7)

17% (8)

8.74 years

7.74 years

10.81 years

46% (16)

50% (27)

34% (16)

23%(8)

24% (13)

13%(6)

b) private practice

66% (23)

61% (33)

83% (39)

c) other: both
activities equally,
teacher, judge

11%(4)

15%(8)

4%(2)

26%(9)

6%(3)

9%(4)

Mean score of "Astin" number for
college attended**
Percent attended elite law

Mean of tenure when rendering
sampled decision
Percent appointed by Democratic
presidents
Experience before becoming
judge in:**
a) government

Ethnicity-percent who were not
white**
** p<. 0 5
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Tables 3A-8A set forth information about subsequent approaches used by a
court in association with the approach that it first used, e.g., of the 23 cases that relied
primarily on structure, how many relied on each of the other remaining approaches, etc.
TABLE 3A. WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS STRICT
CONSTRUCTION'
Next Approach Used

Both courts
combined (N=17)

Tax Court (N=15)

District
Courts
(N=2)

Regulations

6%(1)

7%(1)

-

Structure

18% (3)

20% (3)

-

Legislative history

47% (8)

40% (6)

Practical
reasoning

29% (5)

33% (5)

100%

(2)
M

]'he population of cases in wnicn me first approach usea was Sut11 constuuUin was
twenty-five. Eight of these cases had no second approach, seven of which were decided
by the Tax Court and one by a district court.
None of the secondary approaches possesses significance, except for those in
Table 4A, in which the primary approach is regulations. The lack of significance may be
2
due to the large number of empty cells in the cross-tabulations done in the X text for

those tables. See ALAN AGRESTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS

194 (1996) ("When cell counts are so small that chi-squared approximations may be
inadequate, one could combine categories of variables to obtain larger counts.").
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TABLE 4A. WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS REGULATIONSA' * *
Next Approach Used:

Both Courts
Combined (N=42)

Tax Court (N-40)

District
Courts

(N=2)
Strict Construction

2%(1)

3%(1)

Other IRS
pronouncements

7%(3)

5%(2)

50%(1)

Structure

7%(3)

5%(2)

50%(1)

Legislative history

17% (7)

18% (7)

Practical reasoning

67% (28)

70% (28)

-

i ne populauon of cases m which e utrst approacn use was reliance on regulations
was 50. Eight of these cases had no second approach. Of those that had no second
approach, seven were decided by the Tax Court and one by district court.
** p<.05
TABLE SA. WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS OTHER IRS
PRONOUNCEMENTSb
Next Approach Used
Both Courts
Tax Court
District Courts
Combined (N=8)

(N=6)

(N--2)

Regulations

25%(2)

17%(1)

50%(1)

Structure

25%(2)

17%(1)

50%(1)

Legislative history

13%(1)

17%(1)

-

50% (3)
38% (3)
Practical reasoning
b The population of cases in which the first approach used was other IRS pronounce-

ments.
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TABLE 6A. WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS STRUCTURE'
Next Approach Used

Both Courts
Combined (N=23)

Tax Court
(N=21)

District Courts
(N=2)

Regulations

22% (5)

19% (4)

50% (1)

Other IRS
pronouncements

4%(l)

5%(1)

-

Legislative history

22% (5)

19% (4)

50% (1)

Practical reasoning

52% (12)

57% (12)

I he popuauon o cases in WIfl UIe

ipprI
ai

u~u was

uut.Auz

was 2I. r ur of

these cases had no second approach. Of those that did not have a second approach, all
were decided by Tax Court.
TABLE 7A.b WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS LEGISLATIVE

HISTORy

Next Approach
Used

Both Courts
Combined (N=27)

Tax Court
(N-25)

Regulations

11% (3)

12% (3)

Other IRS
pronouncements

11% (3)

8% (2)

Structure

26% (7)

28% (7)

District Courts
(N-2)

50% (1)

50% (1)
52% (13)
52% (14)
Practical reasoning
b r..
j
LUA
,th
---h -A was h--islative history wa
37. Ten of these cases had no second approach; nine were decided by the Tax Court and
one by a district court.
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TABLE 8A. WHEN MOST IMPORTANT APPROACH IS PRACTICAL
_
REASONING
Both Courts
Combined (N=89)

Tax Court
(N=78)

District Courts
(Nf 1)

5%(4)

5%(4)

-

Regulations

35% (31)

36% (28)

27% (3)

Other IRS
pronouncements

17% (15)

14% (11)

36% (4)

Structure

21%(19)

23%(18)

9%(1)

Next Approach
Used
Strict construction

27% (3)
22% (17)
23% (20)
Legislative history
The population of cases in which the first approach used was practical reasoning was
283. In 194 of these cases, there was no second approach. Of these 194 cases, 122 were
decided by the Tax Court and 72 by the district courts.

